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The 1996 American Economics Association Presidential 
address was given by health economist Victor Fuchs(1996) 
and frames the issue of this paper quite well.
After quoting a 1965 article by George Stigler that "the age 
of quantification is now full upon us" and that it will be "a 
scientific revolution of the very first magnitude"(p.6), Fuchs 
goes on to note that the revolution is still in the future: "(b)ut 
the shallow and inconclusive debate over health policy in 
1993-94 contradicts (Stigler's) expectation that this research 
would narrow the range of partisan disputes and make a 
significant contribution to the reconciliation of policy 
differences."(p. 6)
There are many other examples of contemporary social 
issues, and related policies, whose resolution seems immune 
to the insights claimed by social sciences: environmental 
disputes ranging from the northwest salmon to the Utah 
wilderness, welfare reform, in particular the treatment of 
teenage welfare mothers, or even the inheritability of 
intelligence with all of its racial and social darwinist 
implications2. Does the continued intransigence of social 
issues and the stubborn intractability of social policy imply 
that all of the developments in data collection, data storage, 
and data analysis have come to naught, that the age of 
quantification is a bust and that the millennium should see 
social science move in a different direction? I don't draw that 
conclusion, though I accept the problem as quite real.
I believe that social science and empirical investigation can 
make important contributions to our understanding and to 
resolution of policy issues, but only if we are clear on the 
nature of social science and the role of quantification. In 
particular we must admit the limits of our truth claims, their 
communal nature, and the possibility of their being utilized 
to serve vested interests. We must then be very clear about 
our potential contribution and must educate our students and 
the public about what we can offer. Finally, I think that we 
must find ways of broadening access to our basic data and 
analyses in order to include a wider array of interests in the 
dialogue. Visualization techniques graphics-based policy 
simulations may be fruitful in this regard. If so, we social 
scientists and social science data managers will still be active 
participants in the issue/policy discussions and our data and 
analysis could have an even greater effect on those debates.
This view implies a very different set of challenges for social 
science data librarians and for social science data users,
one which will be interesting and potentially quite helpful 
for social scientists as well as for social policy.
The Nature of Social Science: Rhetoric
Fuchs offers three possible explanations for the 
unsatisfactory state of affairs he describes: that health 
economists cannot agree among themselves, that the results 
were not disseminated adequately to influence policy, and 
that differences in values could not be bridged by empirical 
research. He developed a questionnaire to examine the issue 
and concluded that on "positive(i.e. logical positivist) 
issues," there is substantial agreement among health 
economists(seventy-two percent gave the same answer to 
seven of his questions). There is less(thirty-four percent) 
agreement on "policy-value" questions. So he concludes that 
value differences account for the irrelevance of economic 
analysis to the health care reform debate, though the inability 
to convince policy-makers about the "positive" results also 
contributed.(p. 15)3
Fuchs settles comfortably into the mainstream understanding 
of what economists do and even quotes its central document, 
Milton Friedman's Essays in Positive Economics(1953). It is 
based on a distinction between positive or scientific 
statements by economists and normative or value-laden 
statements. That seventy-two percent of health economists 
agree with Fuchs on seven propositions is taken as evidence 
of the possibility of positive economics; Fuchs claims that 
this realm should be expanded to find those positive 
components of policy-value issues, i.e. that economists can 
solve social and policy issues in the degree that they can 
succeed in attaining positive scientific results.
There is a different and more satisfactory way of 
understanding the very real problem that Fuchs highlights. It 
starts again from a particular understanding of the nature of 
economic science, in this case that economics uses "rhetoric" 
to arrive at conclusions whose status and limitations can best 
be understood within that context. Let us examine this 
approach. In an important article in one of the central 
journals of the economics profession, D. McCloskey(1983) 
argued that economics is best understood as a form of 
argumentation or persuasion rather than the value-free 
scientific endeavor that logical positivists would have us 
believe. This effort does allow economists and other social 
scientists to "make knowledge," but it is a contingent 
knowledge which depends greatly on the operation of the 
scientific community of economists, the times, the biases or
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ideologies of researchers, the historical development and 
context of the issues, and the technical capacities of the 
scientists. Rorty(1987) describes this as "pragmatism" and 
suggests that the aspiration of scientists should be to find 
mechanisms to bring about "unforced agreement" among 
themselves, rather than to reach some objective Truth. 
Examination of the main economics journals indicates that 
McCloskey's perspective is gaining a very slow and gradual 
acceptance(Sims, 1996). However, this methodological 
perspective remains controversial (Maki,1995), and, for the 
most part, economists remain minimally introspective about 
their methodology.
When economics is viewed from the perspective of rhetoric, 
the shortcomings of the age of quantification are not 
surprising. Data- based empirical analysis is only one among 
many approaches to persuasion/knowledge. Indeed for 
Aristotle, data are "extrinsic" to making an argument, i.e. not 
an inherent part of the process. As Crowley(1994) notes:
Ancient philosophers seem to have had a clearer 
understanding of the limited usefulness of empirical facts 
than moderns do. Perhaps because of their skepticism 
about the nature of facts, ancient rhetoricians were 
equally skeptical about the persuasive potential of facts. 
Aristotle wrote that facts and testimony were not truly 
within the art of rhetoric...He considered extrinsic proofs 
to be outside of the art ofrhetoric because a rhetor only 
had to pick them up and display them to an audience.(p.
6)
For the Greeks the intrinsic components of arguments were 
the proofs and the canons or principles. Proofs can be logical 
or "logos," pathetic (emotional) or "pathos," and ethical or 
"ethos," all of which can and do play a role in persuasion, 
even in economics. The canons prescribe how a persuasive 
argument is structured, its arrangement, style, delivery, and 
memory(or links with other pieces of shared 
knowledge)(Covino and Jolliffe,1995).
Making a convincing argument about a social issue or policy 
is very complex from this perspective. Data and quantitative 
analysis play a role, one which has certainly increased in 
importance since the nineteenth century. But many other 
elements enter into any research, influence what is accepted 
as true, and determine what is persuasive in policy. Indeed, 
much of McCloskey's original article is concerned with 
illustrating how metaphors, appeals to authority, analogies, 
etc. are immanent in good economic argument.
To understand how we might approach data and empirical 
analysis differently and enhance its role in arguments over 
social issues and policy, let me illustrate the claims that I am 
making with several specific cases.
Social Science Rhetoric Observed
I have chosen three case studies to illustrate different aspects
of the claim that rhetoric best describes what we do in social 
science. One comes from "psychology" considered very 
broadly, one reports on a recent treatment of advances in 
macroeconomics and economic policy, and the final example 
is an overview of the debate on NAFTA (the North 
American Free Trade Agreement) and the role of economic 
analysis.
A. Social Darwinism in Modern Clothes
Darwin's evolutionary theory with its mechanism of natural 
selection provided a powerful metaphor for viewing society.4 
It easily lent itself to categorizations of societies and of 
societal groups as superior and inferior. Herbert Spencer's 
"survival of the fittest" aphorism provided a handy shorthand 
for this supposed process and was the basis for "social 
darwinism," the belief that the elite of society had attained 
that status because of their evolutionary superiority.5 The 
development and application of the IQ test around the turn of 
the century provided a new quantitative measure which could 
be used to document the differences between the superior 
and the inferior, be it in terms of economics or race or 
gender. After this analysis was carried to its logical extreme, 
in the eugenics movement, all became aware that there were 
many confounding factors in the environment which could 
account for most of the variation across groups. Advances in 
social scientific knowledge combined with a realization of 
the potentially terrible implications of eugenics to discredit 
such simple stratifications. This seems an excellent case in 
which quantitative analysis resulted in reaching a truth, i.e. 
that individual variation has a strong biological basis, though 
most differences across broad groups are better explained by 
cultural and environmental factors.
However, the debate is newly joined, history is in the process 
of being repeated. Biology and evolution have once again 
become quite dynamic, and genetic determinism is being 
explored in every area of the individual, from the prevalence 
of cancer to aggression and criminal behavior to 
homosexuality. Evolutionary ecologists use the biological 
framework to examine the whole gamut of societal 
differences from children's food preferences to marriage 
behavior. And though biologists and evolutionary ecologists 
are careful to delimit their claims, it was inevitable that the 
new biology would spawn a return of social darwinism and 
of scientific racism. The latter had continued to exist in the 
backwaters of social science and in non-standard journals, 
and it received much more widespread consideration through 
its identification with Arthur Jensen of University of 
California and Richard Herrnstein of Harvard.
The more recent and more interesting case, from a social 
science perspective, is the social darwinist manifesto <begin 
underline> The Bell Curve. <end underline> (Murray and 
Herrnstein,1994) The argument is simple: that the demands 
of the modern economy and society require higher levels of 
cognition and, as a result, a cognitive elite has emerged.
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Entry into the elite is largely determined by genetic 
inheritance of IQ(sixty percent roughly). While "social 
murrayism," i.e. "rule by the fittest," is not new, it is 
presented in a thoroughly modernist manner, i.e. with reams 
of data and statistics. Indeed the 552 pages of text are 
accompanied by over 100 pages of statistical appendices and 
tables of regressions and other tests, symbolic of "the 
quantitative age." At the same time the book illustrates the 
failure of that age. It was a best seller and reached a wide 
audience. It was widely reviewed, and, as noted by 
Gould(1994), most of the reviewers immediately disqualified 
themselves from assessing the quantitative claims of the 
book. It gained a great deal of credibility simply for its many 
pages of tables, for its quantitative argument. The very 
presence of tables became an important part of the book's 
rhetoric on the issue. And they disqualified many 
participants from the discussion because of their self­
admitted inability to assess the quantitative basis for the 
argument.
Goldberger and Manski did examine the quantitative 
analysis, and they found that the authors' claims were not 
supported by the data and statistical analyses. They wrote: 
"(w)e conclude The Bell Curve. is driven by advocacy for 
HM's vision, not by serious empirical analysis. America may 
or may not be on the way towards a custodial state. Policy 
interventions may or may not be effective. We know no 
more after studying The Bell Curve. than we did before."(p. 
775)
Although Herrnstein was a psychologist, the book can be 
seen as a political tract that has consciously and extensively 
adopted the quantitative rhetoric of social science, with 
notable success. In any case, the issues which the book 
focused on forced the American Psychological Association 
to issue a report of a task force on "Intelligence: Knowns and 
Unknowns"(Neisser,1996) which followed an earlier 
statement of the American Association of Physical 
Anthropologists. These are reminiscent of anti-social 
darwinism/racism statements issued by the American 
Anthropological Association in 1938 and UNESCO in the 
1950s(Degler, 1991, pp. 203- 204). The APA report supports 
the work that has been done in measuring intelligence while 
at the same time noting its limitations. They conclude: "what 
is responsible for(group differences in test performance)?
The fact is that we do not know. Various explanations have 
been proposed, but none is generally accepted."(Neisser, p. 
94)
In any case this debate illustrates that one of the central 
issues that was posed in the 1880s--and seemingly solved 
through quantitative analysis--remains open to dispute. This 
is despite the incredible increase in availability of data and in 
technical sophistication of quantitative analysis. The 
advances of the Quantitative Age have not been successful in 
resolving the century old issue. If we are to reach any 
conclusions, we must bring to bear a much wider range of
mechanisms for discourse, including ethos and pathos as 
well as the empirically based logos which is accepted as the 
substance of contemporary social science.
B. Modern Macroeconomics
Sims(1996) provides another excellent example, in this case 
from contemporary macroeconomics, which again illustrates 
the nature of economic discourse and the inability to reach 
agreement based solely upon logical positivist canons. His 
conclusions are quite different from my own, however.
Macroeconomics, the study of economic processes at the 
national level, is dominated today by a theoretical approach 
termed "new classical" economics. One of its founders, 
Robert Lucas, was honored with the Nobel Prize for 
Economics in 1995. There are two outstanding elements of 
new classical economics: it is consistently based on the 
reigning deductive economic theory of markets and 
maximization, and it allows little role for government policy 
in affecting the macro economy. The newest work in this 
genre deals with one of the remaining puzzles, the existence 
and explanation of business cycles. Its approach is to use 
"computational experiments," computations which are not 
based directly on empirical or econometric work. This is a 
departure from traditional quantitative approaches in 
economics, though it remains fundamentally quantitative.
The Sims article is a critique of this approach and makes the 
case that normal empirical investigation of economic 
phenomena can lead to scientific progress.
His concerns have many parallels with Fuchs's. The 
underlying question is why social science disciplines seem to 
be turning away from empirical investigation, moving 
toward anthropological ethnography on the one hand or 
toward non-empirical quantitative model solving and 
calibration on the other. He concludes that "the popularity of 
the critiques(of traditional empirical work) probably arises 
from the excesses of enthusiasts of statistical methods."(p. 
109) The promises of empirical investigators have gone 
beyond what can be delivered, which contributes to the 
isolation of economists from policy debates. My conclusion 
is that we should be more careful of our claims, and we 
should realize that they are simply one input into the 
argument, the rhetoric, about significant economic and 
policy issues.
Sims's suggestion is quite different and diametrically 
opposed to Fuchs's. He uses the metaphor of economic 
researchers as a priesthood or guild whose purpose is to 
perpetuate a given body of knowledge.(p. 107) That 
knowledge he terms "data reduction," his term for advances 
in natural science and for potential advances in social 
science. Traditional data managers and users will find 
support from Sims. He catalogues many advances in 
empirical macroeconomics gained by applying probability- 
based inference to the new class of dynamic, stochastic,
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general equilibrium models which are at his frontier. This 
may be tempered by his suggestion that those who persist in 
"technically demanding forms of theorizing and data 
analysis" should spend less time criticizing and more time 
reading each other, i.e. should join their priesthoods and 
guilds together.
From my perspective, such a step would only reinforce the 
separation of economic researchers from economic policy 
discussions, the problem highlighted by Fuchs. And given 
the theme of this paper, that we need to find mechanisms to 
open up our discourse to a wider community, the direction 
that Sims suggests is inconsistent. From the standpoint of 
data managers and social science computing specialists, 
creating greater solidarity among guilds would simply extend 
and expand the isolation that troubled Fuchs. It would cause 
data to be further removed into the realm of a very narrow 
"discourse community" insulated from broader discussion 
and from participation in public policy debates.
C. The NAFTA Debate and Economic Analysis
The debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement 
was characterized by incongruous alliances, shifting 
alignments and deep divisions over the merits of the pact. 
Fast track authority was approved in response to fears of an 
unmanageable contest among special interests. NAFTA was 
approved by a narrow margin after supplemental agreements 
over labor and environmental issues were added and after 
last minute bargaining by the Clinton Administration. The 
debate was acrimonious and often gave way to polemics. 
Orme (1993:2) has argued that the debate was not about the 
agreement itself but was instead about "competing domestic 
political agendas and irreconcilable world views." However, 
most of the debate was not conducted in these terms. 
Combatants presented their arguments as scientific facts, 
based upon sophisticated empirical analysis, above reproach 
and self-explanatory to all who would honestly examine 
them. A series of articles appeared from both sides whose 
objective was to dispell the myths and fallacies of 
opponents.(Orme 1993) Opposition was equated with faulty 
thinking, incomplete reasoning or plain stubbornness. 
Particularly divisive was the debate over the employment 
and wage effects of the NAFTA.
Economists entered this debate in an unprecedented manner 
and seemed to be integral to the debate in contrast with the 
health care debate. Seemingly, every position required an 
economic model churning out specific supporting numbers. 
The model of choice during the debate became the 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Its highly 
mathematical nature tended to recast the debate in terms of 
who had the best numbers rather than addressing the 
multifaceted divide separating opposing viewpoints. In 
Congressional Hearings, little mention was made of the 
various structural considerations within the models nor was 
attention given to the implications of various assumptions.
Instead, numbers of jobs to be lost or gained were quoted 
back and forth. Because of the lack of transparency of CGE 
modeling, the policy discourse tended to focus on the sheer 
volume of studies supporting a particular position, or on the 
source of the studies.
As the debate reached its finale, ideas and observations 
seemed to subside in favor of an endless numbers game. 
Various models generated the number of jobs which would 
be lost and the number of jobs which would be created under 
the proposed agreement. Wild variations existed between 
the most optimistic and the most pessimistic projections. The 
Clinton Administration eventually settled on a figure of 
200,000 job gains. Almost all of the modelers advocated or 
opposed NAFTA. There was little discussion of the 
possibility that an agreement could have positive impacts 
under certain conditions, with negative effects in other 
circumstances; the collapse of the peso showed this to be a 
major failing. The debate, then, was over whose numbers 
were better and which study was more scientific and 
impartial. Indeed, discussions of the jobs issue often 
incorporated phrases such as "every reputable study" and "a 
distinguished economist."
A Joint Economic Committee report recently concluded, 
"The predictions of the studies [of the effect on jobs of 
NAFTA] are widely contradictory and the utility of the 
studies in reaching policy conclusions on NAFTA is 
extremely limited."(Glenn, 1993, p. 1) The arguments based 
on CGE models tended to obscure rather than illuminate the 
policy debate. Their complexity and sensitivity to 
specification tended to focus arguments on the quality of the 
model, rather than on its policy significance.
The most advanced CGE and econometric models 
represent the state of the art in terms of internal 
consistency and mathematical elegance. However, these 
models contain a huge number of equations and entail 
many hidden assumptions about unknown parameters: 
elasticities of supply and demand, cross- elasticities of 
demand, substitution rates between capital and labor, 
expenditure functions, and so forth. The solutions require 
high-powered mathematical algorithms. Often the results 
look as if they came from a classic black box: only the 
authors of the models, and perhaps a few other scholars, 
understand all the ingredients (Hufbauer and Schott 1992, 
p.51).
Economists were central to debate over NAFTA, however 
the debate was cast in terms of these highly mathematical 
models. This effectively limited discussion within policy 
circles to the results of these models, with legislators quoting 
numbers back and forth amongst themselves. The result was 
a debate filled with studies and statistics, all of which 
seemed to add little to effective communication. Further 
evidence of the limits on the role of economic analysis was 
the 51-49 vote for NAFTA despite the heavy weight of
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economists and their studies on the pro-NAFTA side of the 
debate.
So NAFTA provides a third example of the inadequacy of 
empirical analysis for resolving public policy debates. In this 
case the most advanced and sophisticated approaches to 
economic analysis were marshaled for the debate. The end 
result of the effort was a complete analytical stalemate, with 
the resolution of the issue depending upon politicians' 
commitment rather than the persuasiveness of economic 
analysis. Indeed the widely varying projections and the 
clearly interested participation of economists was probably 
counterproductive.
What conclusions can be drawn from these three 
experiences? And what direction might we go as economists, 
as social scientists, as data managers and data users, to 
change the manner in which we enter the public policy 
debates and the manner in which we teach social science?
What Lessons for Instruction?
McCloskey's original article advocated the rhetorical stance 
because economists would write better, teach better, have 
better relations with other disciplines, make better 
arguments, and have better dispositions--quite the 
promise!(1983, pp.512-515) It is not clear that increasing use 
of rhetoric has notably changed the discipline, i.e. there is no 
evidence that economists have become more even tempered 
in the last thirteen years. Nonetheless, McCloskey's claim 
about teaching should be taken seriously. He argues that:
economics is badly taught, not because its teachers 
are stupid, but because they often do not recognize the 
tacitness of economic knowledge, and therefore teach by 
axiom and proof instead of by problem-solving and 
practice...It is frustrating for students to be told that 
economics is not primarily a matter of memorizing 
formulas, but a matter of feeling the applicability of 
arguments, of seeing analogies between one application 
and a superficially different one, of knowing when to 
reason verbally and when mathematically, of what 
implicit characterization of the world is most useful for 
correct economics.(p. 507)
This perspective has very important implications for 
instruction and, implicitly, for democracy as well6. The key 
to defining the difference is that rhetoric as an approach to 
knowledge is based upon persuasion, is based upon 
discourse, and strives to reach "unforced agreement." Thus to 
teach a discipline requires more than simply amassing a set 
of axioms, proofs and facts that are then transmitted and 
embodied in explicit knowledge of the students. It requires 
engagement and active knowledge-making on the part of 
students.
The difference from traditional teaching is seen quite clearly 
in instruction in social science. If there are few truths to be
transmitted, students must be empowered to become actively 
involved in investigating issues and in reaching the level of 
agreement that they can. Of course the best results and the 
best techniques of social science should be used, and the best 
and most extensive sources of data should be brought to 
bear. But all of the most sophisticated approaches available 
must be combined with the broader issues of persuasion, 
with the compelling metaphor, with the ethical stance of the 
argument and those making the argument.
This makes a very different challenge out of teaching and 
forces a reworking of the goal of the educational process.
The process is likely to involve much more collaboration 
among students and many more efforts to transmit tacit 
knowledge of a discipline. Students must first be convinced 
to become involved in the discourse, in the effort to "make 
knowledge." While they will not reach an irrefutable truth, 
they can gain greater knowledge about issues, using data and 
other extrinsic proofs, and they can then defend a position 
and contribute to reaching some better resolution of the 
issues involved. When they have a stake in the outcome, 
their attention to the data and the techniques increases.
Teaching based upon rhetoric also may alter the definition of 
the task of the data manager, the data librarian. The 
challenge of finding information, finding data, and knowing 
the methods with which to peruse the data remain. But the 
challenge now it to enable student interaction with the data, 
student research or investigation or knowledge-making. And 
the data can only be part of the argument. So active access to 
and interaction with the quantitative element of economic 
discourse becomes the goal, and learning is facilitated to the 
extent that is achieved. The new technologies are challenging 
the very meaning of data, for the usual organizational 
categories agreed upon through the Library of Congress are 
becoming virtually irrelevant. The new organization is 
keywords and thesaurus based, implying that students can 
create their own organization of data and redefine it in that 
fashion. Of course the meaning of thesaurus comes into play 
here, i.e. storehouse or treasury. One of our social science 
librarians had her students do a search using a new web 
based search engine, and each student returned over 500,000 
references for the term selected. How can they organize that 
data?
What Lessons for Public Policy?
The policy problem is more complex. Very rarely can a 
policy be advocated without support of a social science 
analysis. Even the Utah State Legislature attempts to base its 
parochial attempts to return to an earlier age upon social 
science analysis, albeit research which is used in a way 
opposite its author's intent. (Wilson, 1996) And there are 
now mechanisms in place which allow each side to have its 
own analysts, e.g. the whole industry of think tanks in 
Washington and in state capitals who collaborate with and 
often serve legislators and even lobbyists. In this regard 
policy analysis has come to resemble forensic testimony
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more than science. From a logical positivist standpoint, this 
would be a very unsatisfactory state of affairs; truth should 
not depend on the discourse framework. From a rhetorical 
perspective, however, this is understandable and speaks to 
the importance of social science. At least each position does 
have to have a justification that can be understood in terms 
of social science. This is to the good and a testimony to the 
importance of social science analysis. That opposing 
viewpoints can have their defenders often simply reflects the 
partial and contingent nature of social science knowledge, 
though at times disputes may represent an abuse of 
knowledge and research7. However, the inability of social 
science to give definitive conclusions may contribute to 
cynicism about the process and to dismissal of social science 
as a contributor to the debate. So in the long run, this 
situation may turn unfavorable to the social sciences.
In summary, the use of data and social science analysis in 
instruction and in policy illustrates both the positive and the 
negative of current approaches to social science. In the case 
of instruction, adoption of a rhetorical understanding is 
indeed likely to improve instruction and to give to students, 
particularly undergraduate students, a better sense for how 
social science relates to their lives. In the case of policy, the 
opposite trajectory seems to be underway. While we can 
understand why all sides have their experts, in the long run 
social science may be sullied and will have much less 
importance in policy debates.
How might social science and data(quantitative analysis) be 
used more effectively in policy debates?
What Avenues Are Open?
I believe that the combination of "rhetoric" and the new 
technologies opens up new avenues of linking social science 
approaches with policy issues. The task is to make our 
approach and analysis more accessible to wider groups of 
persons. How can this be done? We are beginning the 
attempt to use "visual rhetoric," i.e. to present the analyses in 
visual terms rather than in our more common statistical 
terms8. This approach of visualization is becoming more 
accepted and used in science. There are major projects at 
NCSA and Argonne in Illinois and at Cornell. The former 
are termed "CAVES" and combine three dimension 
projection of audio and video with high performance 
computing power. They have produced a number of 
simulations of complex processes in visual form, e.g. the 
cooling of molten metal running down an inclined plane. To 
my knowledge they have not simulated economic or social 
science processes, though Cornell does talk of Sociological 
problems.
We are experimenting with different display devices for 
exhibiting data and for allowing the viewer to maneuver 
through the data to investigate relations that may appear.
This is a very inductive approach which we hope may 
broaden access to data and data interpretation. We will see if
the conclusions drawn differ from those the statistical 
procedures had indicated. As you can see there is no need for 
knowledge of sophisticated statistical techniques, that 
anyone with visual acumen could examine the information 
and search for patterns.
The second approach that we will be using is development of 
simulations of social science phenomena, e.g. the role of 
education in expected incomes and health outcomes of 
children in Utah. Here we hope to put in sets of transitional 
probabilities and allow the observers to change the amounts 
of education and see the differing outcomes for categories of 
children, based upon previously calculated statistical 
relations. This draws much more upon the deductive 
framework used in economics. It should allow a much 
broader range of participants into the discourse and open up 
active interaction with the issues and the underlying analysis. 
We hope that this could be a useful input into public policy 
discussions and could even guide some decisions.
While this work is only in its beginning phases, there is 
evidence that the impact of "visual rhetoric" can be 
substantial. What is needed now is its application to closing 
the breach between social science and social policy by 
broadening access of the public to the results of social 
science analysis.
Finally, this effort may provide a new role for the data 
librarian and the data analyst, one which places emphasis on 
the interaction with data as much as with its location and 
access. For to the extent that the information can be 
presented visually it should allow much wider access to the 
data and to the possibility of its interpretation, and therefore 
it should broaden the range of persons who can be included 
in the discourse on a particular issue. Whether this will result 
in a partial response to the query of Victor Fuchs and will 
allow better use and more influence of economic analysis 
remains to be seen. And whether policy will be better made, 
is yet another question that is far from being answered.
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Endnotes
1. Paper presented at the IASSIST/Computing in the Social 
Sciences Conference, Hotel Radisson, Minneapolis, MN, 
May 1995.
K. P. Jameson, Department of Economics, BUC 308, 
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My thanks to David Plante for his assistance, and to the 
members of the "Rhetoric in the Disciplines Study Group" at 
the University of Utah for continuing stimulation and 
support, especially to Chris Oravec, Susan Miller and Mary 
Reddick.
2. The earliiest controversy I worked on was the safety and 
desirability of nuclear power. We organized a 
multidisciplinary team to examine its various dimensions, 
work which resulted in a book.(Sayre, 1978) The subsequent 
decimation of that industry indicates that we had a better 
sense of the complexity of the issue than the firms involved 
in the industry at that time.
3.There are no criteria for differentiating "positive" 
statements from "policy-value" statements. Indeed, there 
often seems little distinction, aside from the level of 
agreement among the economists.
4. Purcell(1973) convincingly traces the late nineteenth 
creation of modern social science and our social science 
disciplines to the intellectual ferment created by Darwinian's 
evolutionary theories.
5. Karl Degler(1993) provides an excellent history of social 
darwinism and its demise, and then the recent resurgence of 
biology which again opened the door to social darwinism.
6. Purcell's(1973) treatment of the relation of democracy and 
social science in the early twentieth century is an excellent 
point of reference on this important issue.
7. One current case in point comes out of "medical science," 
which used the statistical experimental techniques also used 
in social science. A drug test of "bio-equivalence" of four 
thyroid drugs was suppressed by the contracting company 
which apparently did not like the results and therefore raised 
a series of objections.(Wall Street Journal, April 25, 1996)
8. There are a number of Internet Web sites related to this 
issue. Much of the external information for this section was 
taken from them.
